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COMMERCIAL LAW-CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT-
LANDLORD-TENANT-REMEDIES-PRIVATE ACTION 
BY TENANT UNDER MARYLAND'S CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT REQUIRES DEMONSTRATION OF 
ACTUAL LOSS OR INJURY, I.E., DIMINUTION IN 
RENTAL VALUE, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY 
RESTITUTIONARY AWARD OF RENTS PAID FOR THE 
LEASE OF UNLICENSED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY. 
CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613 A.2d 964 (1992). 
The General Assembly of Maryland enacted the state's Consumer 
Protection Act ("CPA") in 1974' in an effort to "take strong 
protective and preventive steps to investigate unlawful consumer 
practices, to assist the public in obtaining relief from these practices, 
and to prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland."2 In 1976 
the legislature broadened the scope of the CPA to include consumer 
real estate within its coverage.3 Ten years later, in Golt v. Phillips,4 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland first interpreted the CPA in the 
consumer real estate context, concluding that the remedy applicable 
to the landlord's violation of the CPA was complete restitution of 
all rents paid.s Recently, in CitaraManis v. Hallowell,6 the court of 
appeals revisited the issues originally considered in Golt, and con-
cluded that a violation of the local property license ordinance at 
issue, in and of itself, was insufficient to warrant restitution of rents 
paid. The CitaraManis holding thus scales back the measure of 
damages and restricts the effectiveness of the CPA as applied in the 
landlord-tenant context. 
In late 1987, Tammy and Michael CitaraManis entered into a 
lease to rent a Howard County residence from Eustace and Portia 
HallowelP The lease ran from November 1, 1987 to October 31, 
1988.8 Thereafter, the CitaraManises and Hallowells orally agreed to 
1. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 609, 1974 Md. Laws 2054. The current version of 
the CPA appears at MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 13-101 to 13-411 (1990 
& Supp. 1993). 
2. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-103(b)(3) (1990). 
3. Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 907, 1976 Md. Laws 2487. 
4. 308 Md. I, 517 A.2d 328 (1986). 
5. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text. 
6. 328 Md. 142, 613 A.2d 964 (1992). 
7. Id. at 144, 613 A.2d at 965. The CitaraManises responded to an advertisement 
placed in a local newspaper by the Hallowells. Id. 
8.Id. 
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extend the lease on a month-to-month basis, with a modest increase 
in the monthly rent.9 On April 30, 1989 the CitaraManises vacated 
the ptemises. 1o Approximately three months later, the CitaraManises 
filed suit against the Hallowells in the Circuit Court for Howard 
County, seeking restitution of all rents paid to the Hallowells under 
the original lease and its extension. II The complaint alleged that the 
Hallowells had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices pro-
hibited by the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. 12 Specifically, the 
CitaraManises asserted that the Hallowells violated section 13-301 of 
the Commercial Law Article by failing to license the property as 
rental property, as mandated by the Howard County Code,13 and by 
subsequently failing to reveal the lack of licensure. 14 
9. [d. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965. 
10. Hallowell v. CitaraManis, 88 Md. App. 160, 163, 594 A.2d 591, 592 (1991). 
11. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965. 
12. [d. (citation omitted). 
13. The relevant portion of the Howard County Code stated as follows: 
SEC. 13.100. HOUSING CODE; INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE. 
the Housing Code of Howard County adopted by the board of 
county commissioners on December 22, 1964, as amended, is incor-
porated herein by reference. 
SEC. 13.101. ENfORCEMENT AUTHORITY. 
(a) The department of public works is hereby given the power 
and authority to enter into, inspect and examine all buildings, im-
provements, real and leasehold property and vehicles of every descrip-
tion, after giving the owner thereof prior written notice of five (5) 
days, to ascertain their condition for health, cleanliness and safety. 
SEC. 13.102. LICENSING AND FEES. 
The director of public works is hereby authorized and empowered 
to fix a schedule of fees or charges to cover the cost of inspection 
and of the issuance of a rental housing license for leasing, renting or 
letting of any buildings or structures, or parts thereof, as dwelling 
units for human habitation in Howard County . . . . Fee schedules 
for such inspection and licensing services will be approved by the 
council by resolution at the recommendation of the director of public 
works. No building or structure, or part thereof, shall be leased, 
rented or let or subleased, subrented or sublet without first obtaining 
a rental housing license from the department of public works and 
paying the requisite fee or charge therefor. 
SEC. 13.103. PENALTIES. 
Any person, firm, corporation, or officer of a corporation- who 
violates any provision adopted or enacted pursuant to the authority 
of this subtitle shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1000. No 
conviction hereunder shall in any manner relieve any person of any 
other penalties or the necessity of compliance with all other applicable 
rules, regulations and laws. 
HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 13.100-103 (1977 & Supp. 1985) (citation 
omitted) (current version at HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 13.100-103, -
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Throughout the resulting litigation, the CitaraManises never 
alleged that the property failed to meet any of their material expec-
tations regarding habitability, comfort or safety; rather, they admitted· 
that they received exactly what they bargained for with respect to 
the physical, tangible condition of the property. IS Nevertheless, they 
contended that section 13-408 (a) , which authorizes private civil ac-
tions "to recover for injury or loss sustained . . . as the result of a 
practice prohibited by [the CPA),"16 entitled them to the restitution-
ary relief requested, regardless of whether the violation had resulted 
in corporeal loss or injury Y The court thus faced the challenge of 
106, -131 (1977 & Supp. 1994». The CitaraManises stated that they became 
aware of the Hallowells' failure to license the property shortly after they 
notified the Hallowells of their intention to vacate the premises. CitaraManis, 
328 Md. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965. 
14. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965. Section 13-301 of the CPA 
provides as follows: 
§ 13-301. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES DEFINED. 
Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any: 
(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written state-
ment, visual description, or other representation of any kind which 
has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading con-
sumers; 
(2) Representation that: 
(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services have 
a sponsorship, approval, accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use, 
benefit, or quantity which they do not have; 
(ii) A merchant has a sponsorship, approval, status affiliation, 
or connection which he does not have; 
... or 
(iv) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services are 
of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model which they 
are not; 
(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends 
to deceive .... 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-301 (1990). 
15. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967. 
16. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-408(a) (1990). 
17. CitaraManis, 328 Md .. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965. In its entirety, section 13-408 
of the CPA provides as follows: 
§ 13-408. ACTION FOR DAMAGES. 
(a) Actions authorized. - In addition to any action by the 
Division or Attorney General authorized by this title and any other 
action otherwise authorized by law, any person may bring an action 
to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as a result of a practice 
prohibited by this title. 
(b) Attorney's fees. - Any person who brings an action to 
recover for injury or loss under this section and who is awarded 
damages may also seek, and the court may award, reasonable attor-
ney's fees. 
(c) Frivolous actions. - If it appears to the satisfaction of the 
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striking the proper balance between the equitable treatment of land-
lords who act in good faith and effective enforcement of the CPA 
in protecting the health and safety of the renting pUblic. In holding 
for the landlords, the Court of Appeals of Maryland elected not to 
penalize them for noncompliance with the CPA that had not, in the 
court's judgment, materially damaged the tenants. 
This interpretation of the CPA, although not insupportable, 
contradicts the arguably "pro-tenant" result reached by the same 
court just six years earlier in Golt v. Phillips. IS In addition, the 
CitaraManis court's treatment of the tenant's common-law illegal 
contract argument deviates from the approach customarily pursued 
by the Maryland courts regarding the enforceability of illegal con-
tracts.19 As a result, the court of appeals' ruling jeopardizes the 
ability of the state's subdivisions to effectuate the purposes of the 
class of regulatory measures implicated in this case. 
In Golt v. Phillips, the tenant responded to an advertisement 
placed by the landlords for a residential apartment in Baltimore 
City.20 After inspecting the apartment and pointing out several con-
ditions that required repair, Mr. Oolt was assured that the deficiencies 
would be promptly corrected.21 When the landlords failed to perform 
the requested rep'airs and other necessary maintenance subsequent to 
Mr. Oolt's occupation of the premises, Mr. Oolt filed a complaint 
with the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community 
Development. 22 The resulting inspection by the Department revealed 
that the landlords had not obtained the license necessary to rent a 
multi-unit dwelling within the city.23 In addition, Mr. Oolt's unit was 
plagued with several other city housing code violations, "including 
the lack of toilet facilities ... defective door locks, and the lack of 
fire exits and fire doors."24 Instead of obtaining the required license 
and correcting the code violations, the landlords evicted Mr. Oolt, 
who was then forced to obtain ·substitute housing at a higher cost. 2S 
The Golt court concluded that the landlords' actions in adver-
tising and renting the unlicensed dwelling constituted "an unfair and 
court, at any time, that an action is brought in bad faith or is of a 
frivolous nature, the court may order the offending party to pay to 
the other party reasonable attorney's fees. 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-408 (1990). 
18. 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986). 
19. See infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text. 




24. [d. at 5-6, 517 A.2d at 330. 
25. [d. at 6, 517 A.2d at 330. 
1993] CitaraManis v. Hallowell 295 
deceptive trade practice," and a clear violation of the CPA.26 There-
fore, under section 13-408(a), which defines the available remedy, 
Mr. Golt could maintain a private action against the landlords in 
order to "recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result 
of" the prohibited practice.27 In addressing the nature of the section 
13-408(a) remedy, the Golt court stated the following: 
This private remedy is purely compensatory; it contains no 
punitive component. Indeed, any punitive assessment under 
the CPA is accomplished by an imposition of a civil penalty 
recoverable by the State under § 13-410, as well as by 
criminal penalties imposed under § 13-411. Thus, in deter-
mining the damages due the consumer, we must look only 
to his actual loss or injury caused by the unfair or deceptive 
trade practices.28 
Having concluded that the actual loss or injury suffered determines 
the damages due, the court faced the remaining pivotal question: 
What constitutes "actual loss or injury" for which the tenant may 
be compensated? 
The Golt court evaluated the nature of the Baltimore City 
licensing ordinance, and noted that 
[i]t is well settled in this State that if a statute requires a 
license for conducting a trade or business, and the statute 
is regulatory in the sense that it is for the protection of the 
public, an unlicensed person will not be able to enforce a 
contract within the provisions of that regulatory statute. 
Moreover, . . . the unlicensed person will not be able to 
recover under quantum meruit, regardless of any unjust 
enrichment to the other party; to permit a recovery under 
quantum meruit would defeat the efficacy of the regulatory 
statute. 29 
Relying upon its analysis of the Baltimore City ordinance, the court 
recognized that the licensing requirement upon which Mr. Golt's 
claim was based was "a model example of a public health and safety 
regulation. "30 As a result, the court determined that the landlords 
should not be permitted to "retain any benefits from the unlicensed 
lease, and [the tenant was entitled to] recover his full damages."31 
The court concluded that "Golt's actual loss [was] comprised of 
restitutionary and consequential damages. ''32 
26. Id. at 9, 517 A.2d at 332. 
27. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-408(a). 
28. Golt, 308 Md. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333 (emphasis added). 
29. Id. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333-34 (citations omitted). 
30. Id. at 13, 517 A.2d at 334. 
31. Id. (emphasis added). 
32. Id. The restitutionary award consisted of all rents paid under the illegal lease. 
Id. at 13-14, 517 A.2d at 334. 
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In CitaraManis, citing the court of appeals' prior interpretation 
in Golt v. Phillips,33 the Circuit Court for Howard County found 
that the landlords' failure to inform the tenants that the property 
was unlicensed violated the CPA. 34 The circuit court granted the 
tenants' motion for summary judgment and directed the landlords 
to return to the tenants all rents paid.3s The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland, reversing the judgment of the circuit court, held that 
the CitaraManises failed to establish any housing code violations 
within the meaning of the rent escrow statute of the Real Property 
Article,36 and consequently suffered no damages recoverable under 
section 13-408(a) of the CP AY The court of special appeals also 
noted that the CPA violation did not result in any diminution of the 
rental value of the property that would justify the restitutionary relief 
requested. 38 The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the reversal 
33. 308 Md. 1,517 A.2d 328 (1986). 
34. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 146, 613 A.2d at 966. 
35. [d. 
36. The rent escrow statute, § 8-211 of the Real Property Article, imposes upon 
residential landlords a duty to correct dangerous defects in their dwelling units. 
Subsections (a) and (b) of that section expressly delineate the purposes for 
which it was enacted: 
(a) The purpose of the section is to provide tenants with a 
mechanism for encouraging the repair of serious and dangerous defects 
which exist within or as part of any residential dwelling unit, or upon 
the property used in common of which the dwelling forms a part. 
The defects sought to be reached by this section are those which 
present a substantial and serious threat of danger to the life, health 
and safety of the occupants of the dwelling unit, and not those which 
merely impair the aesthetic value of the premises, or which are, in 
those locations governed by such codes, housing code violations of a 
non-dangerous nature. 
(b) It is the public policy of Maryland that meaningful sanctions 
be imposed upon those who allow dangerous conditions and defects 
to eXist in leased premises, and that an effective mechanism be 
established for repairing these conditions and halting their creation. 
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211(a), (b) (1988 & Supp. 1993). Subsections 
(c) through (0) further define the scope of the section's application and provide 
the mechanisms to effect the objectives stated in subsections (a) and (b). See 
id. § 8-211(c)-(0) (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
37. Hallowell v. CitaraManis, 88 Md. App. 160, 169-70, 594 A.2d 591, 595-96 
(1991). As noted by Professor Gilligan and others, the relationship between 
the CPA and the Real Property Article has been the source of confusion since 
the adoption of the CPA amendments addressing consumer realty. M. Michele 
Gilligan, Landlord Beware: Private Actions By Tenants Under the Maryland 
Consumer Protection Act, U. BALT. L.F., Fall 1987, at 18-19 (discussing Golt 
and citing Comment, Maryland's Consumer Protection Act: A Private Cause 
of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices, 38 MD. L. REV. 733, 764 
(1979». 
38. Hallowell, 88 Md. App. at 170, 594 A.2d at 596. With respect to establishing 
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of the trial court, albeit on other grounds.39 The majority concluded 
that the holding of Go/t was based upon facts which "[stood] in 
stark contrast with those of the case sub judice"40 and did not 
mandate restitution in the instant case. 
Notwithstanding the "actual loss or injury" language of the 
Go/t opinion,41 the CitaraManises asserted that their unknowing rental 
of unlicensed property did constitute "injury or loss" as contemplated 
by section 13-408 (a) and the Go/t court's interpretation of that 
section.42 In support of their argument, the CitaraManises pointed 
to the following language from the unanimous Go/t opinion: "It is 
evident that the license fee is charged to support the cost of inspec-
tions, and not to raise revenue. Therefore, [the landlords] may not 
retain any benefits from the unlicensed lease, and Golt may recover 
his full damages. "43 Acknowledging that this language may have left 
the impression that the licensure failure itself, rather than the sub-
standard physical condition of the premises, gave rise to the award 
of restitution, the CitaraManis majority concluded that the court had 
previously "spoke[n] much too broadly" in that portion of the Go/t 
opinion.44 
Unlike the tenant in Go/t, the CitaraManises had "not allege[d] 
that the house they had rented was unclean, unsafe, uninhabitable 
or unsuitable in any regard. "45 The only "damage" that they sus-
tained, therefore, resulted from unknowingly renting unlicensed prop-
erty. According to the majority, unknowingly renting unlicensed 
the measure of damages applicable to actions brought pursuant to § 13-408(a) 
of the CPA, the court of special appeals concluded that the situation is no 
different than those causes founded in the applicable provisions of the Real 
Property Article. Id. The Real Property Article provisions generally focus upon 
the dangerous condition of the premises. See supra note 36. 
39. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 164, 613 A.2d at 974. The case was remanded to the 
trial court with instructions 
to determine whether the tenants are able to prove that they suffered 
"actual injury or loss," justifying recovery under § 13-408(a) of the 
CPA [according to the "diminution in value" standard], or that the 
landlords' loss of all rent would be proportional to the purpose sought 
to be achieved by the licensing scheme . 
. Id. at 164, 613 A.2d at 975. 
40. Id. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967. 
41. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
42. CitaraManis, 3.28 Md. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967 nn.2-3 and accompanying text. 
43. Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. I, 13,517 A.2d 328, 334 (1986) (cited in CitaraManis, 
328 Md. at 149-50, 613 A.2d at 967). 
44. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 150, 613 A.2d at 967 ("Because of the obvious actual 
loss and damage suffered by the tenant in Golt who paid rent for what proved 
to be an uninhabitable apartment, we realize now, for the reasons hereinafter 
set forth, that we spoke much too broadly in making the statement just 
quoted."). 
45. Id. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967. 
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property was not the type of damage intended by the legislature to 
be redressed in a section 13-408(a) action. 46 Rather, the majority 
concluded that the proper interpretation of section 13-408(a)-as one 
section within a comprehensive enactment-evidences the intent of 
the legislature to require a showing akin to a diminution in rental 
value in order to justify the award of damages. 47 
In divining the legislative impetus behind passage of the CPA, 
the court benefitted from an express statement of the legislative intent 
underlying the measure: "[The CPA] is intended to provide minimum 
standards for the protection of consumers in the State."48 To fulfill 
46. [d. at 151, 613 A.2d at 968. "It is manifest from the language employed in § 
13-408(a) that the General Assembly intended that a plaintiff pursuing a private 
action under the CPA prove actual 'injury or loss sustained.''' /d. (citing Golt, 
308 Md. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333). 
47. See id. at 152-53, 613 A.2d at 968-69. 
48. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-103(a) (1990). The statement of intent is 
further codified as follows: . 
§ 13-102. DECLARATION OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. 
(a) Findings. - (I) The General Assembly of Maryland finds 
that consumer protection is one of the major issues which confront 
all levels of government, and that there has been mounting concern 
over the increase of deceptive practices in connection with sales of 
merchandise, real property, and services and the extension of credit. 
(2) The General Assembly recognizes that there are federal and 
State laws which offer protection in these areas, especially insofar as 
consumer credit practices are concerned, but it finds that existing laws 
are inadequate, poody coordinated and not widely known or ade-
quately enforced. 
(3) The General Assembly of Maryland also finds, as a result of 
public hearings in some of the metropolitan counties during the 1973 
interim, that improved enforcement procedures are necessary to help 
alleviate the growing problem of deceptive consumer practices and 
urges that favorable consideration be given to requests for increased 
budget allocation for increases in staff and other measures tending to 
improve the enforcement capabilities or increase the authority of the 
[Division of Consumer Protection of the Office of the Attorney 
General]. 
(b) Purpose. - (I) It is the intention of this legislation to set 
certain minimum statewide standards for the protection of the con-
sumers across the State, and the General Assembly strongly urges that 
local subdivisions which have created consumer protection agencies at 
the local level encourage the function of these agencies at least to the 
minimum level set forth in the standards of this title. 
(2) The General Assembly is concerned that public confidence in 
merchants offering goods, services, realty, and credit is being under-
mined, although the majority of business people operate with integrity 
and sincere regard for the consumer. 
(3) The General Assembly concludes, therefore, that it should 
take strong protective and preventative steps to investigate unlawful 
consumer practices, to assist the public in obtaining relief from these 
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this objective, the legislature provided alternative avenues through 
which those acts prohibited by the CPA are addressed. The CPA 
empowers the Division of Consumer Protection of the Office of the 
Attorney General (the "Division"), either in response to a complaint 
filed by a consumer or upon its own initiative, to investigate allegedly 
unfair or deceptive trade practices.49 Depending upon the circum-
stances, the Division's investigation may lead to resolution through 
dismissal,50 conciliation,51 imposition of a cease and desist order, 52 
submission to arbitration,53 or injunction. 54 Sections 13-410 (civil 
penalties) and 13-411 (criminal penalties) detail the sanctions appli-
cable to these public enforcement actions.55 
Juxtaposed with the enforcement proceedings conducted by the 
Division, section 13-408(a) permits a private action by an aggrieved 
consumer. 56 Although the legislature provided, in one comprehensive 
measure, alternative means with which to address violations of con-
sumer confidence, the CitaraManis majority concluded that the bases 
upon which public enforcement actions proceed are clearly distin-
guishable from those necessary to sustain private actionsY Evaluating 
the language and organization of section 13-408(a), the court of 
appeals delineated the distinction as follows: 
In a public enforcement proceeding "[a]ny practice prohib-
ited by this title is a violation . . . whether or not any 
consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged as 
a result of that practice." § 13-302. In contrast, a private 
enforcement proceeding pursuant to § 13-408(a) expressly 
practices, and to prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland. 
It is the purpose of this title to accomplish these ends and thereby 
maintain the health and welfare of the citizens of the State. 
[d. § 13-102. The General Assembly's direction that "[the CPA] shall be 
construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose," id. § 13-105, further 
bolsters the sweeping mandate of §§ 13-102 and 13-103. 
49. [d. § 13-204. . 
50. See id. § 13-401(d). 
51. See id. § 13-402. 
52. See id. § 13-403 (1990 & Supp. 1993). 
53. See id. § 13-404 (1990). 
54. See id. § 13-406. 
55. See id. §§ 13-410, 13-411 (1990 & Supp. 1993). In the case of a "first violation," 
a merchant is subject to a fine of not more than $1000 for each such violation. 
[d. § 13-41O(a) (Supp. 1993). Repeat offenders are subject to a fine of not 
more than $5000 for each subsequent violation. [d. § 13-41O(b). In addition 
to the imposition of a fine, or in the alternative, "any person who violates 
any provision of [the CPA] is guilty of a misdemeanor and ... on conviction 
is subject to ... imprisonment not exceeding one year .... " [d. § 13-411(a) 
(1990). 
56. See id. § 13-408 (1990). 
57. CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 154, 613 A.2d 964, 969-70 (1992). 
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only permits a consumer "to recover for injury or loss 
sustained by him as the result of a practice prohibited by 
this title." § 13-408(a). Section 13-408(a), therefore, requires 
an aggrieved consumer to establish the nature of the actual 
injury or loss that he or she has allegedly sustained as a 
result of the prohibited practice. 58 
Citing the support of commentators,S9 the majority concluded that 
"[a] construction of the CPA that would establish § 13-302 as a 
benchmark to determine whether a consumer has sustained 'injury 
or loss,' within the meaning of § 13-408(a), is both strained and 
illogical."60 The majority also asserted that such a construction would 
transform section 13-408(a) into a punitive measure61-a result both 
unjustified by its language and unnecessary in light of the express 
punitive provisions of sections 13-410 and 13-411.62 Thus, according 
to the majority, comprehensive examination and analysis of the 
CP A's structure demonstrate that a private action under section 13-
408(a) requires a showing of actual injury or loss in order to recover 
damages. 
In addition to the discussion of the language and structure of 
the CPA, the majority engaged in a survey of other state courts' 
treatment of similar consumer protection statutes, 
and observe[d] that the consumer protection statutes con-
strued therein fall into three general categories: (1) statutes 
that require proof of actual damages and in the absence of 
such proof award nominal statutory damages; (2) statutes 
that explicitly require that an aggrieved consumer be granted 
a complete refund; and (3) statutes that explicitly require 
actual damages be proven.63 
58. Id. at 152, 613 A.2d at 969. 
59. Id. The following language was quoted by the CitaraManis majority: 
Enjoining an activity that has not yet caused actual harm seems 
entirely consistent with an important purpose of the Act, to prevent 
unfair or deceptive practices. See id. § 13-102(b)(3). It is clearly 
contrary, however, to the language of § 13-408 to permit a consumer 
a cause of action if no damages have been sustained, and no legitimate 
legislative purpose would be served by such a reading. Section 13-302 
should be interpreted to pertain to enforcement action by the Attorney 
General and the Division of Consumer Protection, and § 13-408 should 
be read to control the elements necessary to establish a private cause 
of action. 
Id. at 153,613 A.2d at 969 (quoting Comment, Maryland's Consumer Protec-
tion Act: A Private Cause of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices, 
38 MD. L. REV. 733, 739 n.50 (1979» (emphasis in CitaraManis). 
60. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 153, 613 A.2d at 969. 
61. Id. 
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
63. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 155, 613 A.2d at 970. 
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Upon reviewing statutes in each category, the court found the lan-
guage in Maryland's section 13-408(a) most similar to the type (3) 
statute enacted by the Connecticut legislature.64 As a result, the 
majority considered Conaway v. Prestia,6S interpreting the concomi-
tant Connecticut statute in a factual setting identical to the present 
case. 
Connecticut's statute at issue in Conaway provided that "[a]ny 
person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property ... 
as a result of ... a [prohibited] method, act or practice ... may 
bring an action ... to recover actual damages. "66 Addressing the 
issue of damages, the Connecticut court concluded that the injuries 
or losses compensable under the quoted portion of the statute were 
limited to those that could be "ascertain[ed] with reasonable certainty 
[as] the diminution of the rental value occasioned by the defendants' 
wrongful conduct. "67 Although the CitaraManis majority acknowl-
edged the notable absence of the word "actual" in the Maryland 
CPA,68 it interpreted the Golt opinion as equating "injury or loss" 
with "actual damages. "69 Persuaded by the rationale of the Connec-
ticut court, the court of appeals concluded that the "injury or loss" 
compensable under section 13-408(a) in both Golt and CitaraManis 
was measured by the diminution in value of the property. 70 
The design of section 13-408(a) and the majority's conclusions 
regarding the underlying legislative intent, present a persuasive ar-
gument that the failure to license property in accordance with local 
ordinances does not justify the complete restitution of all rents. paid. 71 
Nevertheless, Judge Robert M. Bell emphatically argued in dissent 
of CitaraManis that the theories of recovery and measure of damages 
asserted by the CitaraManises were the same as those advanced and 
sustained by the unanimous Galt court. 72 According to the dissent, 
the condition of the rental property was not the fulcrum upon which 
the restitutio nary award pivoted; to the contrary, the condition of 
the premises was immaterial to the Galt holding and the award of 
64. Id. at 155·58, 613 A.2d at 970-71. 
65. 464 A.2d 847 (Conn. 1983). 
66. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 157 n.6, 613 A.2d at 971 n.6 (emphasis added) 
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-11Og(a) (1979» (alteration in CitaraManis). 
67. Conaway, 464 A.2d at 853. 
68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
69. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 157-58, 613 A.2d at 971; see Golt v. Phillips, 308 
Md. 1, 12, 517 A.2d 328, 333 (1986). 
70. CitaraManis, 329 Md. at 157-58, 613 A.2d at 971. 
71. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text. 
72. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 165-68, 613 A.2d at 975-77 (Bell, Robert M., J., 
dissenting). Judge Eldridge joined in Judge Bell's dissenting opinion. Id. at 
181, 613 A.2d at 983 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting). 
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damages therein. 73 The simple failure of the landlords to conform to 
the requirements of the housing code and the CPA justified the 
award of full restitution in Golt.74 The dissent concluded that an 
award of full restitution was the appropriate remedy in CitaraManis, 
not only because of the stare decisis import of Golt, but because the 
language and result of Golt also carried the tacit approval of the 
Maryland General Assembly. 75 
Subsequent legislative treatment of the issues presented in Golt 
lends credence to the appellants' assertions that the award of full 
restitution for a landlord's violation of the CPA was intended-or 
at least approved-by the Maryland General Assembly.76 As proof 
of the legislature's acquiescence to the holding of Golt, the appellants 
noted the introduction and subsequent defeat in committee of House 
Bill 391.77 The bill, which was introduced during the 1989 session as 
an amendment to section 8-204 of the Real Property Article, proposed 
the following: 
(e)(1) Notwithstanding any local ordinance or regulation 
requiring the leasing or inspection of single or multi-family 
units, a tenant shall pay rent which is due to a landlord if: 
(i) The premises were rendered to or provided for the 
tenants; 
(ii) The premises were otherwise habitable; 
(iii) The premises were used and enjoyed by the tenant; 
and 
(iv) The tenant was under reasonable notice that the 
landlord, in rendering or providing such premises, ex-
pected to be paid by the tenant. 
(2) The amount of rent paid by a tenant who rents a single 
or multi-family unit from a landlord who does not comply 
with a local ordinance or regulation described in paragraph 
(1) of this subsection shall reflect the difference between the 
property value of the rented unit and the property value of 
a similar unit rented in compliance with the local ordinance 
or regulation described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.78 
Public commentary regarding the bill indicates that both its propo-
nents and opponents recognized that it was introduced with the 
73. Id. at 169, 613 A.2d at 977 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting) ("The facts, 
including those pertaining to the condition of the leased premises, though 
detailed in the Golt opinion, played no role in our decision. "). 
74. Id. at 168-69, 613 A.2d at 976-77 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting). 
75. Id. at 176-81, 613 A.2d at 980-83 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting). 
76. See Brief for Appellant at 12, CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613 
A.2d 964 (1992). 
77. Id. 
78. Md. H.R. 391, Reg. Sess. (1989). 
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objective of overruling Golt.79 Following testimony to this effect, the 
bill was defeated in the House Judiciary Committee by a vote of 
fifteen to six. so This defeat, argued Judge Bell, demonstrates that the 
General Assembly "acquiesced ... in the definition given [in Golt] 
to 'injury or loss' as used in [section] 13-408 and in the [restitutionary] 
remedy ... prescribed for the CPA violation, as well. "SI Given the 
legislative history, the dissent maintained that the court had no 
latitude under the facts of CitaraManis to reach a result so contrary 
to the holding of Golt.S2 
As an alternative to the section 13-408(a) action, the Citara-
Manises argued that "they were entitled to obtain restitution of the 
rent they paid during their occupancy of the demised premises because 
the rent was paid pursuant to an illegal and unenforceable lease."s3 
In this respect, the appellants analogized the lease agreement to 
contracts between consumers and persons engaged in occupations for 
which the law requires a license.s4 In these licensing cases, the court 
79. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 179, 613 A.2d at 982 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting); 
see Brief for Appellant at 12-13, CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613 
A.2d 964 (1992); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. at 15-19, 
CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613 A.2d 964 (1992). 
One proponent of House Bill 391 wrote to the House Judiciary Committee 
that Legal Aid attorneys in Cumberland, Maryland, armed with Golt, 
started recruiting tenants who were being evicted for various reasons 
and showing them how to recover large damages from landlords over 
technicalities with the City's Occupancy [sic] permit process. 
Dozens of landlords were sued by tenants for thousands of dollars 
because the landlords' permit was [sic] no longer valid. They were 
using a court case from Baltimore (Golt vs. Phillips) and the judges 
were helpless to rule in an equitable manner because the Maryland 
Law was mute on the subject. As a stop gap measure, Cumberland 
repealed it's occupancy permit ordinance until a remedy could be 
found. We believe House Bill 391 is that remedy. 
Letter from Mary C. Miltenberger, representing the Legislation Committee of 
the Associated Landlords of Cumberland Area, to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, microfilmed on Md. Gen. Assembly Leg. Hist., H.R. 391, Reg. Sess. 
(1989). 
80. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 180,613 A.2d at 983 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting). 
81. [d. 
82.Id. 
83. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158, 613 A.2d at 971. The appellants argued that the 
lease was rendered illegal by virtue of the violation of § 13.103 of the Howard 
County Code. See supra note 13. As noted by Judge Bell in dissent, "[t]he 
majority does not dispute that the lease in this case was illegal, against the 
public policy of the State of Maryland, and, hence, unenforceable. Indeed, it 
specifically so acknowledges." [d. at 173, 613 A.2d at 979 (Bell, Robert M., 
J., dissenting). That the failure to conform to the Baltimore City housing code 
licensing provision rendered the lease therein "illegal" was also acknowledged 
in Golt. See Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1, 13, 517 A.2d 328, 334 (1986). 
84. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158, 613 A.2d at 971-72. 
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of appeals "has denied a recovery, either on an express contract 
theory or on the theory of quantum meruit, sought by one who 
rendered services for which payment has not yet been made. "85 If 
applied to the case at bar, this common-law illegal contract theory 
would weigh in favor of awarding restitution to the former tenants. 
At base, the common-law restitution principle urged by the 
tenants is analogous to the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit, 
under which one who provides valuable goods or services is permitted, 
pursuant to a contract implied in law, to recover the value of the 
goods or services from the party in receipt. 86 The law permits recovery 
in order to extract from the party in receipt of the goods or services 
the "unjust enrichment" that would accrue if recovery were prohib-
ited. 87 According to this principle, in the absence of an enforceable 
lease, a landlord may recover from the tenant the reasonable rental 
value of the occupied premises.88 Recovery by the landlord is therefore 
predicated upon a demonstration that the tenants are unjustly en-
riched by escaping payment of the reasonable rental value of the 
property. 
The premise posed by the CitaraManises mirrors the previously 
described example: Because the landlords failed to license the property 
as required, any rent received unlawfully, and therefore unjustly, 
enriches them, to the detriment of the tenants. Restitution of the 
rent paid would force the landlords to disgorge the benefits that were 
unjustly received. According to the majority, however, the 
CitaraManises' restitution argument failed because "the tenants have 
received everything that they bargained for, and a necessary element 
justifying the remedy of restitution, i.e., unjust enrichment, is lack-
85.Id. 
86. See, e.g., McCardie & Akers Constr. Co. v. Bonney, 647 S.W.2d 193, 194 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("Quantum meruit is based on a promise implied by the 
law that a person will pay reasonable compensation for valuable services or 
materials provided at his request or with his approval. "). 
87. See, e.g., Department of Envtl. Resources v. Winn, 597 A.2d 281 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1991). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court delineated the doctrine as 
follows: 
The equitable doctrine of quantum meruit involves a class of obliga-
tions imposed by law, regardless of the intention or assent of the 
parties for reasons dictated by justice and is based on the concept 
that no one who benefits by the labor and materials of another should 
be unjustly enriched thereby. To avoid such unjust enrichment, the 
law implies a promise to pay a reasonable amount for the labor and 
materials furnished, even absent a specific contract therefor. 
Id. at 284 n.3. 
88. C/. Holliday v. Pegram, 85 S.E. 908 (S.C. 1915) (where rental contract is 
rendered unenforceable by the failure of the parties to agree to the amount of 
the rent, claim for rent due was properly advanced on quantum meruit grounds). 
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ing. "89 The cases cited in the majority opinion in support of this 
conclusion90 generally provide that "a defendant, who in good con-
science provides services should not be required to return the moneys 
received, since in so doing, it would bestow an unjust enrichment 
upon the complaining party.' '91 According to the majority, requiring 
the landlord to forfeit the rent paid is "'tantamount to civil punish-
ment, "'92 an objective expressly served by other measures in the 
CPA.93 
In situations where the party seeking recovery lacks a required 
license-as in the occupational licensing cases advanced by the ap-
pellants as analogous to their case94-permitting the provider of goods 
or services to recover their value runs counter to the public interests 
preserved in denying restitutionary relief. As noted by Judge Kar-
wacki in the majority opinion, Maryland law provides that 
"[u]nenforceability of a contract because of illegality is a function 
of the strength of the public policy involved together with the degree 
of the violation of that policy under the facts of the case. "95 In 
CitaraManis, the majority concluded that "the facts ... on summary 
judgment do not present the degree of illegality that triggers appli-
cation of the rule of the unlicensed occupation cases."96 
In drawing the distinction between the occupational licensing 
cases and the facts of CitaraManis, the majority determined that, 
"[i]n effect, premises and not people are to be licensed" under the 
Howard County Code provision.97 The majority opinion analogized 
89. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 159, 613 A.2d at 972. 
90. See CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 159-62, 613 A.2d at 972-73 (citing Comet Theatre 
Enters., Inc. v. Cartwright, 195 F.2d 80, 83 (9th Cir. 1952); Host v. Gauntlett, 
341 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973); Mosley v. Johnson, 453 P.2d 
149, 152 (Utah 1969». 
91. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 160, 613 A.2d at 973. 
92. [d. at 160-61, 613 A.2d at 973 (quoting Host v. Gauntlett, 341 N.Y.S.2d 201, 
204 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973» (emphasis in Host). 
93. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
94. The demonstrative cases cited by the court are: S.A.S. Personnel Consultants, 
Inc. v. Pat-Pan, Inc., 286 Md. 335, 341, 407 A.2d 1139, 1143 (1979); Harry 
Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290, 293, 265 A.2d 759, 761 (1970); Thorpe 
v. Carte, 252 Md. 523,529,250 A.2d 618, 621-22 (1969); Smirlock v. Potomac, 
235 Md. 195, 203, 200 A.2d 922, 926-27 (1964); Snodgrass v. Immler, 232 
Md. 416, 421-22, 194 A.2d 103, 105-06 (1963); and Goldsmith v. Manufacturers' 
Liab. Ins. Co., 132 Md. 283, 286, 103 A. 627, 628 (1918). See CitaraManis, 
328 Md. at 158, 613 A.2d at 972. 
95. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158,613 A.2d at 971-72 (citing Schloss v. Davis, 213 
Md. 119, 124-25, 131 A.2d 287, 290-91 (1957». 
96. [d. at 162, 613 A.2d at 973; see infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
97. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 162, 613 A.2d at 973. This statement follows from 
the assertion ,by Judge Karwacki that, rather than determining competence as 
a service provider, the license here concerned has as its "purpose the identi-
fication of premises to be inspected in order to determine compliance with 
housing codes." [d. 
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the setting of the instant case to that presented in Schloss v. Davis. 98 
Judge Karwacki summarized the facts of Schloss as follows: 
The plaintiff in Schloss performed what we would now call 
construction manager services in the construction of a res-
idence for the owner. In the construction manager's suit on 
an oral contract for all of the allegedly promised compen-
sation, the owner defended on the ground, inter alia, that 
the construction manager had violated the local building 
code by beginning work on the foundation and frame with-
out a building permit. The permit apparently was obtained 
when final drawings became available before work pro-
gressed beyond the foundation and frame stages.99 
In permitting the construction manager to recover, the Schloss court 
noted the following: 
It is the general rule that recovery will be denied if a contract 
is illegal in purpose or made by a person lacking the legal 
qualifications to contract. But there is a recognized exception 
where a denial of recovery would impose a penalty out of 
all proportion to the public good, particularly where the 
violation is not of a serious nature and merely incidental to 
the performance of the contract. ... We think the violation 
here falls within the exception. loo 
According to the CitaraManis majority, awarding restitution to the 
CitaraManises would likewise constitute "a penalty out of all pro-
portion to the public good" sought to be preserved by the licensing 
requirement. 101 The tenants bargained for safe, healthy, and secure 
housing, which, licensed or not, is exactly what they received. 
The "premises versus persons" distinction made by the 
CitaraManis majority adds an element: previously unacknowledged in 
Maryland case law. 102 In addition, this distinction arguably contradicts 
98. 213 Md. 119, 124-25, 131 A.2d 287, 290-91 (1957). 
99. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 162, 613 A.2d at 974. 
100. [d. at 163, 613 A.2d at 974 (quoting Schloss, 213 Md. at 125, 131 A.2d at 
291) (citations omitted). 
101. See id. 
102. Judge Bell asserts in dissent that the analysis undertaken by the court in Golt, 
far from contemplating the distinction now asserted by the majority, was 
performed solely with an eye toward determining whether the Baltimore City 
ordinance at issue was regulatory or revenue-generating. CitaraManis, 328 Md. 
at 170, 613 A.2d at 977 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting); see Golt v. Phillips, 
308 Md. I, 12-13, 517 A.id 328, 333-34 (1986). But cf. Harry Berenter, Inc. 
v. Berman, 258 Md. 290, 265 A.2d 759 (1970). The Berman court noted that 
[IJf a statute requiring a license for conducting a trade, business or 
profession is regulatory in nature for the protection of the public, 
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the court's analogy to, and reliance upon, Schloss. In Schloss, the 
defendant argued, on two independent grounds, that the contract for 
services was "void for illegality. "103 As one basis for this illegality 
argument, the defendant asserted the plaintiff's failure to obtain the 
necessary building permits before advancing with construction. This 
permit issue was the point on which Judge Karwacki in CitaraManis 
drew the analogy to Schloss: 
The approval of dwellings under a rental housing licensing 
scheme, from a public safety and welfare standpoint, is 
more like the approval of plans for the construction of 
buildings than the licensing of service occupations. Inasmuch 
as the construction manager in Schloss was permitted affir-
matively to recover promised compensation, a fortiori, the 
Hallowells, on the present record, are not obliged to refund 
rent paid.104 
This analogy-linking the permit issue in Schloss to the rental 
license at issue in CitaraManis-is persuasive to a point; to consider 
it conclusive, however, disregards the very language from Schloss 
quoted by Judge Karwacki: lo5 "The contract for supervision was not 
illegal per se" as a consequence of the plaintiff's failure to obtain 
the required permits. 106 In CitaraManis, however, the lease of the 
unlicensed property patently violated the Howard County Code, 107 
and was therefore illegal per se. Thus, both the strength of the public 
policy at issue in CitaraManis and the degree of the violation exceed 
those weighed by the Schloss court. While the conclusion that the 
facts of CitaraManis "do not present the degree of illegality that 
triggers application of the rule of the unlicensed occupation cases" 
may still be tenable,l08 the nature of the violation committed in 
rather than merely to raise revenue, an unlicensed person will not be 
given the assistance of the courts in enforcing contracts within the 
provisions of the regulatory statute because such enforcement is against 
public opinion. 
[d. at 293, 265 A.2d 761. Although the general rule, as quoted, refers to "an 
unlicensed person," the author is unaware of any Maryland decision preceding 
CitaraManis which explicitly emphasizes "person" rather than "unlicensed." 
103. Schloss v. Davis, 213 Md. 119, 124, 131 A.2d 287, 290 (1957). 
104. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 163-64, 613 A.2d at 974. 
105. See id. at 162-63, 613 A.2d at 974. 
106. Schloss, 213 Md. at 125, 131 A.2d at 291. Further, and as also quoted by 
Judge Karwacki, see CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 163, 613 A.2d at 974, "[a)t 
most, [the contract) was conditioned upon the obtaining of a permit by [the 
owner), based on the approval of the architectural drawings which [the owner) 
undertook to supply." Schloss, 213 Md. at 125, 131 A.2d at 291. 
107. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
108. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 162, 613 A.2d at 973; see supra note 96 and 
accompanying text. 
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Schloss, and thus the degree of illegality present, are distinguishably 
less severe than their analogous counterparts in CitaraManis. 
The Schloss court's analysis of the second basis upon which the 
defendant challenged the validity of the contract-whether the su-
pervisor had the license required of general contractors by the Mar-
yland Annotated Code-contemplated the traditional distinction drawn 
in the occupational licensing cases: Is the purpose of the licensing 
statute or ordinance regulatory or revenue-generating? 109 Speaking 
for the Schloss court, Judge Henderson considered and dismissed the 
defendant's argument in the span of two sentences: 
The contention that Davis had no general contractor's li-
cense, as required by Code (1951), Art. 56, Sec. 168, is 
without merit. It was noted in Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 
615, that this particular license is for revenue and not for 
regulation. 110 
On this point, therefore, the holding of Schloss, rather than sup-
porting the dismissal of the CitaraManises' complaint, merely con-
forms to the general rule that distinguishes between revenue-generating 
and regulatory statutes, and further strengthens the argument basing 
recovery in an analogy to the "unenforceability-due-to-illegality" 
principle that prevails in the occupational licensing cases. II I The 
property licensing ordinance violated by the Hallowells was, and is, 
regulatory, rather than revenue-generating. 112 Thus, on both common-
law illegal contract bases, the treatment of the licensing issue in 
Schloss can be seen, not as justification for denial of the Citara-
Manises' claim, but as solid grounds of support for complete resti-
tution of all rents paid. 113 
109. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; supra note 43 and accompanying 
text; supra note 102. 
110. Schloss, 213 Md. at 125-26, 131 A.2d at 291. 
Ill. Compare supra note 110 and accompanying text with supra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
112. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous Baltimore 
City ordinance considered by the Golt court). 
113. The majority opinion's treatment of the occupational licensing cases ends with 
the following: 
For the same reasons set forth in this Part IV.B., we spoke too 
broadly in Golt to the extent that Golt rests the recovery of rent paid 
on the application to the licensing of rental housing of a per se rule 
derived from the occupational licensing cases. Golt did not discuss, 
or cite, Schloss. 
CitaraMan;s, 328 Md. at 164, 613 A.2d at 974. Although Judge Bell, in dissent 
in CitaraMan;s, does not specifically address the majority's substantive treat-
ment of Schloss from the same perspective advanced herein, he notes as 
"curious" the retrospective use of that case to undermine the unmistakable 
restitutionary underpinnings and holding of Golt, a case that Schloss predates 
by almost thirty years. Id. at 174, 613 A.2d at 979-80 (Bell, Robert M., J., 
dissenting). 
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The CitaraManis majority expressly declined to consider "whether 
lack of the required rental housing license, in and of itself and 
without regard to the condition of the premises, would be sufficient 
to bar a landlord's claim for unpaid rent or for use and occupa-
tion. "114 The treatment of the occupational licensing cases in the 
majority opinion implies, however, that although rent "voluntarily" 
paid may not be recovered by the tenant, the unenforceability of the 
lease would preclude the landlord from the award of rent due but 
unpaid. lIS Even though this dichotomy arguably hinges upon form 
rather than substance, such a holding would be consistent with the 
Connecticut Supreme Court's treatment of its analogous consumer 
protection statute,1I6 and with those occupational licensing cases 
denying recovery to the unlicensed plaintiffs. 1I7 
One purpose of the Maryland CPA, implicitly if not explicitly, 
is to assist the state's subdivisions in enforcing local property licensure 
laws.1I8 The dissenters argue that rather than supporting enforcement 
efforts, the interpretation of the CPA's remedy provisions in the 
instant case vitiates the economic incentive that, in the wake of Golt 
v. Phillips, encouraged residential landlords to comply with local 
licensing requirements. 1I9 Instead, the CitaraManis result offers a 
114. Id. at 158-59, 613 A.2d at 972. 
115. See CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158-64,613 A.2d at 971-74. The striking deviation 
from the pattern is the recovery, in Schloss, by the unlicensed contractor. As 
illustrated above, see supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text, the example 
of Schloss, rather than demonstrating an exception to the prevailing jurispru-
dence, conforms to the established distinction between regulatory and revenue-
generating licenses. 
116. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the Connecticut 
consumer protection statute expressly precludes recovery of rent by the landlord 
in such circumstances: 
Sec. 47a-5. (Formerly Sec. 47-24a). No RENT RECOVERABLE FOR PERIOD 
OF UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION. In any borough, city or town which 
requires a certificate of occupancy prior to human habitation of any 
building located therein, if any building is occupied in whole or in 
part without such occupancy permit, rent shall not be recoverable by 
the owner or lessor of the premises for such period of unlawful 
occupation. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-5 (1979). The Supreme Court of Connecticut reached 
the same result as the CitaraManis majority, even in the face of the above-
quoted provision. See Conaway v. Prestia, 464 A.2d 847 (Conn. 1983). Neither 
the Maryland CPA nor the Maryland Real Property Article contains such a 
provision. 
117. See, e.g., Snodgrass v. Immler, 232 Md. 416, 194 A.2d 103 (1963). 
118. See Statement of Mary Gardner, Legal Officer Supervisor, Department of 
Housing and Community Development (of Baltimore) before the House Judi-
ciary Committee (Feb. 9, 1989) ("The licensing requirement is essential to the 
City's ability to ensure decent housing."), microfilmed on Md. Gen. Assembly 
Leg. Hist., H.R. 391, Reg. Sess (1989); supra note 48. 
119. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 175,613 A.2d at 980 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting). 
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disincentive to landlords, making it economical for them to ignore 
similar licensing requirements until such time as the lack of licensure 
is uncovered. As long as the tenant continues to pay the rent as 
provided in the unenforceable lease, the landlord's exposure, in any 
civil action initiated by the tenant, is limited to the difference between 
the rent received and the actual rental value of the premises for the 
period covered by the payments. 120 In response, the majority notes 
that such practices more appropriately fall within the purview of the 
public enforcement proceedings effected by the CPA, rather than a 
section 13-408(a) private civil action.t21 
As alleged by Judge Bell, the CitaraManis majority's treatment 
of the damages question may well hinge on the perceived unfairness 
in taking from the landlords that which they seem to have honestly 
earned, and conveying upon the tenants a subsequently "unjust 
enrichment." 122 The intentions and motivations of the landlords 
notwithstanding, the dissenting opinion reasonably points out that, 
in addressing the relative equities of the situation, it makes little 
sense to expend such considerable effort to aid that party which 
failed to comply with the law, and in so failing, created his or her 
own liability.123 Nonetheless, under these facts, where one of two 
parties may be seen to have been "unjustly enriched," the CitaraManis 
holding resolves the issue in a manner consistent with the reasonable 
contractual expectations of the parties l24 and arguably in accordance 
with the declared spirit of the CPA, although clearly to the financial 
detriment of these particular consumers. The battle lines thus drawn, 125 
unless and until the legislature chooses to affirmatively address the 
issue and enact a contrary result, the holding of CitaraManis has 
recast what was the post-Golt sword of the cunning tenant into the 
protective shield of those unwary tenants who fall victim to unscru-
pulous landlords. 
Michael B. MacWilliams 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 154, 613 A.2d at 969 ("[T]he appropriate means for addressing this 
potential [disincentive] problem is through the imposition of civil penalties 
under § 13-410, and criminal penalties under § 13-411 of the CPA, not by 
transforming § 13-408(a) into a punitive measure."). 
122. Id. at 177, 613 A.2d at 981 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting). 
123. Id. at 177-78, 613 A.2d at 981 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting). 
124. This is true only if the "value" associated with the approval of the licensing 
authority is entirely discounted. 
125. See Galola v. Snyder, 328 Md. 182, 613 A.2d 983 (1992) (reaching same result 
on analogous facts with same members of court comprising majority and 
dissent). 
